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Executive Summary
In 2002 the Zambian government rejected 35,000 
tons of food aid because of the possibility that it 
could be genetically modified [GM]. During this 
time roughly 3 million people in Zambia faced 
severe food shortages and extreme hunger. As the 
government turned away this food aid, a debate 
over GM food aid arose globally. The government 
of Zambia remains firmly against both milled and 
nonmilled GM food imports. Other governments 
throughout southern Africa have placed similar 
restrictions, although most will accept milled GM 
food aid.
Much of southern Africa remains skeptical of GM 
food for a number of reasons. Some of the major 
concerns include potential health effects, environ­
mental effects, cross-contamination between GM 
seeds (from nonmilled GM food imports] and GM- 
free crops in Africa, and increased labeling and 
certification costs for exporting goods to the 
European Union.
On the other hand, many pro-GM groups 
throughout Zambia and the rest of southern Africa 
advocate for the acceptance of GM food aid. These 
groups commonly believe that the governments of 
southern Africa are making the wrong decision in 
denying food assistance to starving individuals. 
They point to the benefits of GM technology, 
which may include improved nutrition, decreased 
pesticide use, increased production and higher 
yields, and lower production costs.
Zambians remain extremely poor and malnourished. 
Poor government policies and widespread corrup­
tion, as well as a lack of natural resources, a high 
rate of HIV/AIDS, rapid population growth, and 
low agricultural productivity, all contribute to 
Zambia's chronic food insecurity. Zambians' need 
for food assistance remains great, yet the govern­
ment continues to turn away GM food aid.
An examination of the stakeholders involved in the 
administration of food aid can help to illustrate the 
inadequacies within the food aid system.
Stakeholders include international institutions
(namely the World Food Programme), U.S. agri­
businesses and shippers, nongovernmental organiza­
tions (NGOs), and recipient countries' producers, 
consumers, and importers. The administration of 
U.S. food aid has come to be known as the iron
triangle, referring to the power of three stake­
holders—agribusinesses, shippers, and NGOs— 
over global food aid and their practices fostering 
the current structure of food aid programs.
Many international and development experts have 
faulted the United States for using the food aid 
system to benefit a small number of U.S. agribusi­
nesses and shippers. NGOs, the third component 
of the iron triangle, have also been faulted for their 
dependence on food aid. The United States has 
increasingly advocated for widespread GM food 
acceptance, both within southern Africa and the 
European Union.
Your assignment is to design a policy (or a set of 
policies) that attempts to ensure the effective use 
of food aid, while being acceptable to stakeholders 
within Zambia, other countries in southern Africa, 
and donor countries. Policies must address the 
imbalances seen within the iron triangle and, most 
important, tackle the root causes of poverty in an 
effort to alleviate the need for food aid.
Background
Zambia's Rejection of GM Food Aid
Three million people in Zambia, nearly one-third of 
the country's population, continually face severe 
food shortages. Witnessing the severe malnutrition 
in Zambia, governments of many high-income 
countries have offered food assistance. In 2002 
Zambia refused 35,000 tons of food aid from the 
United States because of the possibility that the 
food could be genetically modified (GM). Food was 
sent to Zambia, refused by the government, and 
then rerouted to neighboring countries that 
accepted the aid.
Since 2002 the food security situation in Zambia 
has not improved. According to the Zambia 
National Farmers Union, Zambia has only slightly 
more than half of its maize strategic national 
reserves against the estimated requirement 
[Business Day 2005).
Many factors contribute to Zambia's food insecur­
ity. The country has suffered from harsh weather 
conditions, including extreme drought and erratic 
rainfall. Government corruption is widespread, as is
the mismanagement of food supplies. Auditor 
General Fred Siame reported that the corruption 
amounts to "billions of kwacha being misapplied 
every day" [Carnell 2001). A general lack of natural 
resources, distorted trade policies, and the spread 
of HIV/AIDS add to the chronic poverty that 
exists in Zambia.
Zambia's chronic poverty and its hunger crisis, 
followed by the government's rejection of food aid, 
brought the GM food aid debate into the spot­
light. Campaigns have since been launched on both 
sides of the issue; some believe southern Africa 
should accept GM food aid, whereas others believe 
that GM food aid should be rejected no matter 
what the circumstances.
As the largest donor to the World Food Pro­
gramme [WFP], the United States provides two- 
thirds of the food aid needed to meet emergencies 
around the world [Amber Waves 2004). Unlike 
most donor countries, the United States sends 
direct food shipments from U.S. farms rather than 
cash donations that recipients can use to buy food 
locally. In 2000 the U.S. government supplied 61.5 
percent of global food aid [Amber Waves 2004). 
As GM crops are increasingly cultivated in the 
United States, it makes sense that recipient coun­
tries would see an increased volume of GM food 
aid. Since 1995, production of GM crops in the 
United States has soared, as has U.S. consumption 
of GM foods.
Before Zambia's rejection of this aid, the WFP had 
been freely delivering GM and non-GM food aid 
for seven years (1995-2002). It was not until 
Zambia's rejection that other countries throughout 
southern Africa became concerned about the 
possibility of GM food in their region.
Zambia rejects both milled and nonmilled GM 
foods [Zulu 2005). Agriculture Minister Mundia 
Sikatana stated, "In view of the current scientific 
uncertainty surrounding the issue . . . government 
has decided to base its decision not to accept GM 
foods in Zambia on the precautionary principle" 
[BBC News 2002). Sikatana also stated, "In the face 
of scientific uncertainty, the country should thus 
refrain from action that might adversely affect 
human and animal heath, as well as harm the 
environment" [Knight 2002).
Organic producers and the Processors Association 
of Zambia are also concerned about the health 
effects, and the president Levy Mwanawasa of 
Zambia has been known to describe GM foods as 
"poison."
The main concern regarding nonmilled GM food is 
the potential for cross-contamination with other 
maize varieties. If nonmilled GM food is accepted 
into Zambia, the seeds can be planted. GM crops 
could begin growing in the region and breed with 
non-GM varieties. An influx of GM food in the 
region, many fear, will cause a sharp decline in 
southern Africa's ability to export to the European 
Union (EU).
Countries in the EU have strict GM food import 
standards. If southern African countries accept 
nonmilled GM food aid and then want to export 
their goods to Europe, they must meet the EU's 
GM food-labeling requirements. The EU's strict 
import policy has the potential to create trade bar­
riers by increasing the cost of exporting goods to 
Europe. Given that food exports make up roughly 
30 percent of Zambia's gross domestic product 
(GDP), a market loss in this sector would be 
extremely detrimental to the country's economic 
and social well-being (Agence France Presse 2003).
Rejecting GM food, however, comes with a price. 
In 2002 Zambia rejected a US$50 million line of 
credit from the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
upon discovering that the agreement would force 
Zambia to purchase GM commodities [Zulu 2005; 
Esipisu 2002).
Because Zambia has refused to distribute GM food 
aid to its people, the WFP has kept this aid in 
storage units in the country. In 2004 villagers 
raided these units and stole the GM maize. Shortly 
afterward, the government increased its efforts to 
gain support for its rejection of GM foods. Also in 
2004 GM soya was reported to have been smug­
gled into Zambia. The Zambian Minister of Agricul­
ture and Cooperatives Mundia Sikatana stated that, 
"The government is going to improve phyto- 
sanitary surveillance measures at all border posts to 
inspect all agricultural products coming into the 
country" (Xinhua News Agency 2004).
In response to food shortages and a rise in the 
domestic price of white maize, Zambia has imported 
GM-free foods from neighboring countries
[Shacinda 2005). In 2002, for example, Zambia was 
able to import non-GM maize from Tanzania.
In the past several years the Zambian government 
has stepped up its legal protection against GM 
food. Zambia currently follows the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety (UN Office for the Coordi­
nation of Humanitarian Affairs 2004). The proto­
col was ratified in 2004, and, as stated by the U.S. 
Department of State, “the objective of this first 
Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
is to contribute to the safe transfer, handling and 
use of living modified organisms (LMOs)—such as 
genetically engineered plants, animals, and mi­
crobes’—that cross international borders. The Bio­
safety Protocol is also intended to avoid adverse 
effects on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity without unnecessarily disrupting world 
food trade." The U.S. Department of State website 
also states that "the Protocol provides countries 
the opportunity to obtain information before new 
biotech organisms are imported. It acknowledges 
each country's right to regulate bio-engineered 
organisms, subject to existing international obliga­
tions. It also creates a framework to help improve 
the capacity of developing countries to protect 
biodiversity" (U.S. Department of State 2003).
Most important, the protocol now includes both 
labeling and documentation requirements. For the 
87 member states of the protocol, "all bulk ship­
ments of living or genetically modified organisms 
intended for food, feed or processing are to be 
identified as 'may contain LMOs'" (UNEP 2004). 
Details about the importer and exporter must also 
be included in the documentation. This binding 
requirement helps countries know what they are 
receiving and whether or not the goods contain 
LMOs. In other words, this new requirement gives 
developing countries the right to know the back­
ground on imported goods, including food aid. 
The United States, as well as many other large agri­
cultural producers and exporters, has not sup­
ported this reform. The protocol does not state 
how GM commodities are to be labeled, other than 
identifying them as "may contain LMOs." In addi­
tion, the protocol does not address food safety, 
segregation of commodities, and consumer product 
labeling (U.S. Department of State 2003).
In 2005, as part of Zambia's National Biosafety and 
Biotech Strategy, the Zambian government intro­
duced new biosafety legislation. This legislation
further regulates GM goods, establishes a National 
Biosafety Authority, and launches biosafety 
research. In addition, the legislation penalizes those 
who fail to abide by this biosafety legislation (UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs 2004).
Support for GM Foods
Despite the anti-GM movement by the Zambian 
government, many groups in Zambia have lobbied 
for GM foods. In 2003 the Biotech Outreach 
Society of Zambia was set up to promote the 
acceptance of GM technology (Zulu 2005). This 
group has lobbied the Zambian government on the 
basis of a study conducted by southern African 
scientists. Although the study concluded that envi­
ronmental risk factors for GM crops remain a 
challenge, it also concluded that GM foods pose no 
immediate danger to either humans or animals and 
that nations should accept GM technology because 
of the potential for increased yields (Geloo 2005). 
The African Biotechnological Trust and African 
Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum have been 
established by policy makers to increase acceptance 
of GM crops (Peta 2002b).
It is important to remember that food aid does not 
occur as an isolated event. It is entirely tied to the 
chronic poverty that pervades much of Africa. If 
the economic and social well-being of these coun­
tries improved, perhaps the need for food aid 
would disappear altogether and a discussion about 
GM food aid would be unnecessary.
Stakeholders
As the issue of GM food aid becomes increasingly 
contentious among donor countries, recipient 
countries, NGOs, and international institutions, it 
is important to examine the role each stakeholder 
plays in the context of Zambia's (and the majority 
of southern Africa's) food crisis.
The United Nations/World Food 
Programme
In 2002 the UN issued the following statement 
regarding GM food:
There are no existing international agree­
ments yet in force with regard to trade in
food or food aid that deal specifically with 
food containing GMOs [genetically modi­
fied organisms]. It is UN policy that the 
decision with regard to the acceptance of 
GM commodities as part of food aid 
transactions rests with the recipient coun­
tries and that is the case in southern 
Africa. It is WFP policy that all donated 
food meet the food safety standards of 
both the donor and recipient countries 
and all applicable international standards, 
guidelines and recommendations.
Based on national information from a 
variety of sources and current scientific 
knowledge, FAO, WHO and WFP hold 
the view that the consumption of foods 
containing GMOs now being provided as 
food aid in southern Africa is not likely to 
present human health risk. Therefore, 
these foods may be eaten. The Organiza­
tions confirm that to date they are not 
aware of scientifically documented cases in 
which the consumption of these foods has 
had negative human health effects [FAO 
2002).
In addition to the UN statement, the WFP sets its 
own policy regarding GM food assistance. The 
WFP's proposed policy concerning GM-food aid is 
as follows [WFP 2003):
Food aid must, from a legal standpoint, 
adhere to the same laws and international 
agreements that apply to commercial agri­
cultural trade. WFP food donations must, 
therefore, meet internationally agreed 
standards that apply to trade in food 
products. Where such standards do not 
currently exist—as is the case with trade in 
GM/biotech foods—the Programme has 
no legal authority to impose them and 
must respond instead to applicable national 
regulations, if such exist. It is not the legal 
prerogative of WFP to impose standards 
on commercial food transactions involving 
Member States without their expressed 
consent or to offer technical advice on the 
desirability or formulation of food-import 
regulations.
WFP requires its country offices to keep 
abreast of and comply with all national
regulations on the importation of food, 
including any that may relate to 
GM/biotech foods. Such regulations must 
be followed as rations are developed, pro­
curement actions are undertaken, and 
country offices seek the agreement of 
beneficiary governments to import food 
aid donations, whether purchased or pro­
vided in-kind. WFP continues to maintain 
its long-standing policy that only food that 
is approved as safe for human consump­
tion in both the donor and recipient coun­
tries should be used as food aid. Country 
offices are expected to comply fully with 
existing national import policies, whatever 
form they may take.
WFP anticipates that the Cartagena Proto­
col will take effect later in 2003. As rati­
fying nations adapt their import regimes 
to reflect the provisions of the Protocol, 
WFP country offices will be expected to 
comply with any consequent changes in 
national import regulations.
Within the framework outlined above, the 
Programme will continue to accept dona­
tions of GM/biotech foods. If a donor 
does not wish to have its cash donations 
used to purchase GM foods, the Pro­
gramme will comply with any such request.
The WFP also "complains that its work to assist the 
millions of hunger-affected Zambians has become 
'more difficult' due to the continued ban of GM 
food in the country." Because the United States is 
the largest food aid donor, the WFP said it was 
difficult to find non-GM food aid [Afrol News 
2002).
Stakeholders in the United States
As governments throughout southern Africa 
placed restrictions on GM food imports, the 
United States increased its lobbying efforts, advo­
cating for GM food aid acceptance. U.S. pro-GM 
food aid campaigns were visible at both the 2002 
World Food Summit in South Africa and the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
2003.
The Iron Triangle. The "iron triangle" is often used 
to describe the state of U.S. politics, specifically the
close policy-making ties between Congress, special 
interest groups, and government bureaucracies. In 
this case, however, the iron triangle refers to the 
power of three groups that foster the current sys­
tem of food aid: (I) a small number of food vendors 
[agribusinesses); (2) a small number of shippers; and 
[3] NGOs [Barrett and Maxwell 2005).
Food aid has been driven by donors (mainly their 
domestic farm and foreign policy concerns), rather 
than the recipient countries (Barrett and Maxwell 
2005). A U.S. law requires that 75 percent of U.S. 
food aid is sourced, fortified, processed, and 
bagged in the United States (Lobe 2005). Food aid, 
then, is directly tied to subsidized food grown in 
the United States. USAID buys the surplus of sub­
sidized food and sends it as direct food aid ship­
ments, creating a guaranteed market for U.S. agri­
businesses. The largest beneficiaries of this system 
are Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland. In 2004 
more than US$700 million in food commodities 
were sold by just four companies and their subsidi­
aries to USAID's food aid program (Ghosh 2005).
The iron triangle representing food aid also guaran­
tees business for a limited number of shippers. 
Another U.S. law states that 75 percent of all food 
aid must be transported on U.S.-flagged vessels. 
The U.S. shipping industry handles only 3 percent 
of U.S. imports and exports yet is required to ship 
three-quarters of U.S. food aid overseas. The cost 
of exporting food aid on U.S. vessels has raised the 
price of transportation nearly 80 percent (Lobe 
2005). More than half of the US$300 million spent 
to ship food aid exported in 2004 was gained by 
just five shipping companies (Ghosh 2005).
The third group affiliated with the iron triangle 
consists of NGOs. Many of these charitable 
organizations depend on food aid for much of 
their annual budgets. In 2001 food aid accounted 
for one quarter to one half of the budgets of 
CARE and Catholic Relief Services (Dugger 2005). 
NGOs like these, known for distributing food in 
low-income countries, have actually become grain 
traders. In an effort to generate revenue for their 
anti-poverty programs, NGOs like these have been 
found selling large volumes of donated food on 
local markets. Chris Barrett has pointed out that 
the costs of transporting, storing, and administer­
ing food eat up at least 50 cents of each dollar's 
worth of food aid, so this approach is not an effi­
cient way to finance long-term development 
(Dugger 2005).
The United States vs. the European Union. As 
some governments in Africa reject these GM 
crops, the United States finds itself pitted against 
the European Union. The EU has always been much 
more skeptical of GM foods than has the United 
States. Between 1999 and 2002, the EU banned GM 
crops. By the end of 2002, however, the EU 
decided to allow GM food imports. The new regu­
lations require GM goods to be labeled with a 
DNA code bar.
During the time that the EU was most wary of GM 
imports, the United States was pressuring Africa to 
accept GM food aid. The EU's initial rejection of 
GM food led to much of Africa's nervousness 
regarding GM food assistance; if GM seeds con­
taminated their non-GM crops, Africa's trade rela­
tions with the EU could be negatively impacted. 
Between 1999 and 2002, GM food would have 
been blocked from EU markets. Since then, labeling 
requirements have the potential to increase the 
costs of exporting GM agricultural products to 
Europe.
The United States has pressured the EU to accept 
GM crops more widely. In 2003 the United States 
filed a complaint with the World Trade Organiza­
tion (WTO) against the EU, stating that "the EU 
countries have unjustifiably halted approval of new 
GMO crops since 1998—effectively excluding a 
growing portion of U.S. farm trade" [Agence 
France Presse 2003). Argentina, Canada, and Egypt 
joined the United States in filing this WTO case; 
supporting third parties included Australia, Chile, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, and Uruguay [Pegg 2003). Soon 
after, however, Egypt, the only African country to 
support the WTO challenge, withdrew its support 
owing to both consumer and environmental 
concerns (Friends of the Earth 2003).
The United States has also accused Europe of 
spreading "disinformation" against GM foods. 
Perhaps, some believe, this campaign is an attempt 
to "settle trade scores between European and U.S. 
companies at the expense of the poor in Africa" 
(Peta 2002b). In 2003 former U.S. president Jimmy 
Carter stated at a benefit for Africa, "It has been 
very grevious to me ... to hear some either 
misguided or deliberately lying people in Europe,
to propagate the idea that somehow genetically 
modified seeds are poisonous" [Reuters 2003],
In June 2003 President Bush gave a speech to the 
U.S. biotechnology industry, stating, "For the sake 
of a continent threatened by famine I urge the 
European governments to end their opposition to 
biotechnology ... many African nations avoid 
investing in biotechnology, worried that their 
products will be shut out of important European 
markets" [Mulvany 2004],
HIV/AIDS Programs and C M  Foods. The United 
States has linked GM foods with HIV/AIDS pro­
grams. With the highest HIV/AIDS infection rates 
in the world, southern Africa needs assistance to 
help control this disease. The United States has 
made GM food available to AIDS patients to help 
increase the food supply to those infected with this 
disease. In 2003 Tommy Thompson, then U.S. 
secretary of health and human services, urged 
Zambia to rethink its anti-GMO policy. Thompson 
stated, "It was a wrong decision by the government 
and I hope they rethink it. We are going to make 
more food available to AIDS patients and the 
government must decide" [Shacinda 2005],
Non-CM  Food Aid. it is important to note that 
the United States has offered non-GM food aid to 
many countries in southern Africa, as well as help 
in assessing the safety of GM-grain [Dow Jones 
Business News 2002], In 2002 Andrew Natsios, 
the USAID administrator at the time, stated, "We 
offered non-GM foods, but they all declined to 
accept it. We would have preferred to send non- 
GM wheat or rice, but they only wanted maize. We 
tried to source non-GM maize, but the industry 
said they could not guarantee that it was GM-free" 
[Vidal 2002], In Zambia, the staple food is maize, 
not wheat or rice.
Zambia and Other African Countries
Countries within southern Africa have distinct 
policies regarding GM food imports. Some reject 
all GM food; others allow it in the country if it is 
first milled; and others have no restrictions 
regarding GM food imports. Within these coun­
tries, individuals hold a diverse set of opinions on 
GM food.
Producers and consumers in Africa have a variety 
of general GM food concerns. Some fear that an
increase in GM production will decrease the diver­
sity of crops throughout southern Africa. Many 
believe that reliance on fewer species is risky; if a 
disease were to arise that these GM crops could 
not withstand, or if an insect becomes resistant to 
the pesticide, an entire crop could be wiped out. 
Another shared concern is the cross-contamination 
of GM crops with non-GM crops. If crops become 
GM-contaminated, consumers may be unaware of 
whether or not the food they are consuming is 
GM-free; producers may be concerned about their 
ability to export to Europe. Some Africans believe 
GM food could have adverse health effects. 
Although they are now in the majority of foods 
consumed in the United States, many do not 
believe that food-safety testing for GM food is 
adequate. Another major concern is the control of 
biotechnology by only a few multinational com­
panies. Some within Africa fear a loss of food 
sovereignty as the multinationals grow and domi­
nate the seed market.
Other producers and consumers, however, may 
want access to GM food aid. In the face of 
starvation, poor Africans have taken extreme 
measures, such as eating soil, roots, and leaves, just 
to stay alive. They are often unhappy that their 
governments are making decisions for them. It is a 
widespread belief that if Africans resort these types 
of emergency coping strategies, they should not be 
denied access to GM food [Peta 2002a],
Producers may also want to increase GM imports. 
GM foods have proven beneficial in South Africa. 
Often GM seeds can reduce the amount of pesti­
cides needed, increase yields, and provide increased 
nutritional value. By decreasing production costs, 
GM seeds could also raise profits for producers. 
Without the opportunity to grow GM seeds, 
producers may be missing out on both increased 
domestic production [and consumption] and a large 
potential export market.
Governments in southern Africa, however, are 
almost unanimous in placing some kind of limita­
tion on GM food imports. Of these countries, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe have garnered the most 
media attention. South Africa is the only country 
in the 14-nation Southern African Development 
Community [SADC] that has licensed the 
production of transgenic crops, including both 
cotton and maize. Currently, about 80 percent of 
South Africa's cotton farmers are using GM seeds,
leading to higher yields, a lighter workload, and less 
money spent on pesticides [Reynolds 2003],
Selected examples of governments throughout 
southern Africa and their attempts to limit GM 
food imports are described below.
Zimbabwe. Just 40 percent of Zimbabwe's con­
sumption needs can be met from its domestic 
production [FAO 2003], Between 2000/2001 and 
2001/2002, Zimbabwe's maize harvest fell by 50 
percent. In 2002/2003 its grain harvest was 
expected to fall a further 50 percent [ACT Interna­
tional 2002], yet the country is adamant against 
importing nonmilled GM food aid [Business Day 
2005], President Robert Mugabe has rejected thou­
sands of tons of corn and sent it elsewhere in an 
effort to prevent it from being planted as seed 
[Corey 2003],
Although the government of Zimbabwe has largely 
rejected GM food aid, many citizens have 
expressed their desire for this GM food. Decisions 
made in Harare may prevent food from reaching 
those who need it most.
Angola and Sudan. Sudan has imposed restrictions 
requiring that food imports be non-GM certified. 
Under U.S. pressure, however, the Sudanese 
government put in place an interim waiver on the 
GM food restriction until July 2004 and then 
extended the waiver for another six months, 
through at least January 2005 [African Centre for 
Biosafety and EarthLife Africa 2004],
Concerned with biosafety and biodiversity, Angola 
has insisted that food aid, if GM contaminated, 
must be milled before it can be accepted into the 
country [Reuters 2004],
USAID and WFP have criticized the decisions of 
these two countries [African Centre for Biosafety 
and EarthLife Africa 2004], These organizations 
have pressured both countries to remove these 
restrictions; the WFP has said that Angola's food 
aid would decline if it must first be milled [Reuters 
2004],
In 2004, 60 African farm campaigners signed an 
open letter to the WFP stating that the United 
States pressured both Angola and Sudan to accept 
GM food imports. This letter included signatures 
from the South Africa-based African Center for
Biosafety and Biowatch, Friends of the Earth 
Nigeria, Namibia's Earthlife Africa, and Sudan's 
Ecoterra [Reuters 2004].
"The protest letter points out that the WFP knew 
as long ago as May 2003, the Sudanese govern­
ment intended to impose restrictions on GM food 
aid. Furthermore, they allege that the WFP must 
also have been aware of the August 2003 recom­
mendations of the Advisory Committee on Bio­
technology and Biosafety of the Southern African 
Development Community, [SADC], of which 
Angola is a member, that its member states mill all 
GM grain before accepting it as food aid. Thus, 
they say, the WFP has had adequate advanced 
warning to react to the decisions taken by the 
governments of Angola and Sudan in an appropri­
ate and timely manner" [African Centre for Bio­
safety and EarthLife Africa 2004],
Other African Countries. Other African countries 
have introduced bans and restrictions on GM 
imports as well [Mayet 2005]:
• Algeria introduced a ban on the import, 
distribution, commercialization, and use of 
GM plant material in December 2000.
• Benin prevents imports of GM food aid, 
with a moratorium on GM imports until 
national legislation comes into force.
• Lesotho has permitted the distribution of 
nonmilled GM food aid, alerting citizens 
that grain should be consumed and not 
cultivated [no monitoring in place],
• Mozambique's government prepared to 
accept GM food aid if maize is milled 
before distribution.
• Namibian government rejected GM maize 
in 2002 and instead received wheat for 
food aid.
• Nigeria's government prepared to accept 
GM food aid provided maize is milled 
before distribution.
• Swaziland permitted the distribution of 
nonmilled GM food aid, alerting citizens 
that aid is to be consumed and not culti­
vated [unclear if monitoring is in place].
Lobby Groups
In addition to international institutions, donor 
countries, and recipient countries, lobby groups 
around the world have voiced their opinions on 
GM food aid. Selected examples are listed below.
Greenpeace. In 2002 Annette Coller, the GM 
campaign coordinator for Greenpeace in South 
Africa stated, "When it comes to famine, telling 
anybody not to eat GM food in this situation is a 
position we absolutely cannot take." Coller also said 
that Greenpeace has not changed its stance that 
"GM food is not the long-term solution to the 
African situation" [Johnson 2002],
Friends o f the Earth International. Friends of the 
Earth International [FOEI], a "federation of auton­
omous environmental organizations from all over 
the world," believe that countries should have the 
right to reject GM foods [FOEI 2007). A report 
by FOEI states, "To date, GM crops have done 
nothing to alleviate hunger or poverty. The great 
majority of GM crops cultivated today are used as 
high-priced animal feed to supply rich nations with 
meat. More than four out of every five hectares of 
GM crops are engineered to withstand the applica­
tion of proprietary herbicides sold by the same 
company that markets the GM seed, and have little 
if any relevance to farmers in developing countries 
who often cannot afford to buy these chemicals" 
[FOEI 2007],
CO RE. CORE, the New York-based Congress of 
Racial Equality, has focused their GM efforts 
against Greenpeace. Because of Greenpeace's 
efforts against GM technology in agriculture, 
CORE believes that Greenpeace is worsening 
Africans' situation by helping them stay poor, sick, 
and underdeveloped [CORE 2003],
Policy Options
Although the WFP sets the framework for food 
aid, it is really the policies of the United States and 
countries throughout southern Africa that influ­
ence the actions of the WFP.
U.S. Policy Options—Emergency Food 
Needs
Understanding the iron triangle of food aid helps 
explain the need for policy change. The iron tri­
angle of food aid currently benefits a handful of 
large agribusinesses, shippers, and NGOs.
The United States has distinct policy options for 
helping increase the effectiveness and fairness of 
food aid programs. The first set of policy options 
address the more immediate need for aid and the 
current food shortages.
In Food A id  after F ifty  Years, Barrett and Maxwell 
propose a number of potentially effective policy 
options for food aid donors like the United States. 
The book argues that food aid should be used only 
if there is problem with food availability, together 
with market failures that contribute to lack of 
access to food. If local markets are functioning well, 
food aid should not be sent. Instead, the authors 
say, it is more effective to provide cash transfers or 
jobs to targeted recipients. If local markets are not 
functioning well and there is sufficient food availa­
ble nearby to fill the gap, food aid can be provided 
through local purchases. Last, if local markets are 
not functioning well and there is insufficient food 
available nearby to fill the gap, food aid should be 
provided through intercontinental shipments 
[Barrett and Maxwell 2005].
The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy has 
called for a transition to untied, cash-based food 
aid. This proposal would include the phasing out of 
all sales of food aid and monetization and impose 
strict limitations on shipping food aid over long 
distances, except in emergencies [Lobe 2005],
In 2005 the Bush Administration proposed a new 
law that would allow the U.S. government to buy 
food in Africa for Africans facing food shortages. 
Instead of paying large sums to ship food aid from 
the United States, this proposal would enable U.S. 
food assistance to be purchased closer to recipient 
countries. Both Oxfam and CARE supported this 
change, but it was rejected by Congress.
Even if the Bush proposal were to be accepted, the 
United States would likely continue shipping some 
food aid from its shores. Consequently, one option 
may be to force all U.S. growers to separate GM 
and non-GM grains. USAID could buy from 
growers knowing whether or not they were getting 
GM food or GM-free food. This change would 
make it easy for USAID to purchase food that 
would then be accepted by African countries 
[Greenpeace 2002]. In 2004 a survey by the
American Corn Growers Association found that 
almost one-quarter (23.7 percent) of U.S. grain 
elevators were already "requiring segregation of 
biotech corn from conventional corn varieties" 
(American Corn Growers Association 2004). The 
segregation of products, however, may cause a 
price increase for both GM and GM-free foods.
Another option is to send only milled GM food 
aid to Africa so that the United States does not 
have to differentiate between countries that accept 
GM crops and those that accept only milled GM 
foods.
As the United States continues to increase its culti­
vation of GM crops and send in-kind food dona­
tions to southern Africa, it is boosting the 
marketing of transgenic crops in these regions. 
USAID has several marketing campaigns underway 
to foster the acceptance of GM food aid. They 
have recently set up CABIO, a biotechnology initi­
ative designed to market GM foods in the devel­
oping world. Before CABIO, USAID established the 
Agricultural Biotechnology Support Group, which 
"pushed African governments to introduce intellec­
tual property legislation, clearing the way for bio­
tech corporations to operate in Africa" (Green­
peace 2002). USAID also funds the International 
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Appli­
cations (ISAAA). ISAAA, a pro-GM advocacy 
organization, pressures the developing world to 
adopt biotechnology. Other sponsors of the 
ISAAA include Monsanto, Syngenta, Pioneer Hi- 
Bred, Cargill, and Bayer CropScience (Greenpeace 
2002).
U.S. Policy Options —Long-Term Strategics
The United States could invest in programs to 
address the internal challenges fueling much of 
southern Africa's chronic poverty. Investments in 
health programs, infrastructure, increased agricul­
tural productivity, and transparent governance are 
just a few policy arenas where the United States 
may prove useful.
The least likely, but perhaps most effective, policy 
change would be for the United States to reform 
its domestic agricultural subsidy programs to elimi­
nate surplus production. Without this surplus, the 
United States could look for other methods of aid 
that could benefit both the United States and 
countries throughout southern Africa.
Policy Options in Southern Africa — 
Emergency Food Needs
Two arenas are in great need of reform. First, 
policies to address emergency food needs must be 
set in place. Second, and most important, policies 
must be established that work to overcome the 
root causes of poverty in Africa and the internal 
challenges faced by these countries.
Policies to address food emergencies should include 
a coherent policy toward GM food aid, as well as 
methods for using assistance from donor countries 
effectively. Governments in southern Africa can 
choose to either reject or accept GM food aid; 
they can also demand that GM food be milled 
before crossing their borders. The 14-member 
SADC recommends that its members accept milled 
GM grains. In addition, these countries can decide 
whether or not they want to invest in biotech­
nology and make transgenic crops a reality in their 
region.
If countries decide not to accept GM food aid, 
they must come up with other ways to overcome 
the food shortages in their region. The African 
population is growing by 3.5 percent a year, 
whereas African agriculture is growing by less than 
2 percent a year—not fast enough to feed the con­
tinent's growing population (Peta 2002a). Countries 
in need of aid could seek non-GM imports from 
surrounding countries.
Policy Options in Southern Africa—Long­
term Strategies
The second set of policies must address medium- 
to longer-term strategies necessary to create 
greater sustainability, including improved social and 
economic well-being. Some of the issues most in 
need of attention include poverty reduction, access 
to basic services and farm inputs, the creation of 
buffer grain stocks (which can decrease overall vul­
nerability to food shortages), improved infra­
structure (especially roads), and increased agricul­
tural production. The majority of these issues can 
be addressed through decreased government cor­
ruption, transparent governmental bodies, and 
accountability within the administration.
Many agree that an integrated approach is neces­
sary for sustainability. The United Nations has dis­
cussed how to achieve a Green Revolution in
Africa. A senior official with the UN International 
Fund for Agricultural Development stated that "a 
Green Revolution in Africa could mean increased 
use of chemical fertilizers and high-yielding crop 
varieties that can survive in harsh terrains that are 
subject to recurrent drought" [Brough 2003], This 
same official stated, "The challenge in Africa is to 
achieve increased agricultural productivity in harsh 
or risk-prone environments," referring to the need 
for crop varieties that can cope with less rainfall, 
poorer soils, and a high level of pest attacks 
(Brough 2003],
Assignment to Students
Your assignment is to design a policy (or a set of 
policies] that attempts to ensure effective use of 
food aid, while being acceptable to stakeholders 
within Zambia, other countries in southern Africa, 
and donor countries. Policies must address the 
imbalances seen within the iron triangle and tackle 
the root causes of poverty in an effort to alleviate 
the need for food aid altogether.
Additional Readings
Barrett, C., and Maxwell, D. 2005. Food aid after 
fifty  years: Recasting its role. London: 
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